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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950636-CA 
V, : 
DANNY RAY GRIEGO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ANP NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from judgments and convictions of two 
counts of assault by a prisoner, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995); one count of 
interference with a peace officer, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995); and one count of 
criminal mischief, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1995) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
SI&IEMENT OF ?g$VSS PRESENTEP QN APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion, 
made at the end of the State's case, to dismiss the charges of 
assault by a prisoner and interference with a police officer? 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss, this Court reviews the decision for correctness, 
affording no particular deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
2. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's 
objection to the giving of several jury instructions relating to 
the validity of the arrest underlying the two charges of assault' 
by a prisoner? 
Defendant asks this court to determine the propriety of the 
giving of certain jury instructions, which presents a question of 
law reviewed by this Court under a "correction-of-error" 
standard. Laws v. Blandina Citv. 893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App. 
1995); State v. Brooks. 833 P.2d 362, 363-64 (Utah App. 1992). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the addendum of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Dan Griego was charged with interference with a 
peace officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995); criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1995); and two counts 
of assault by a prisoner, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995) (R. 6-8) (copies 
of the statutes are attached in addendum A). Defendant filed 
pretrial motions to have the charges dismissed in both the 
circuit and the district court based on the officers' warrantless 
entry into defendant's home (R. 17, 23-31, 43).x Both courts 
denied the motion (R. 17-18, 49). 
Defendant again moved to dismiss all the charges at the end 
of the State's case-in-chief during trial (R. 563). In response, 
the prosecutor moved to reduce the criminal mischief charge to a 
defendant has not made a transcript of the motion hearing 
in the district court a part of the record on appeal, and no 
written order is contained in the record. 
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class C misdemeanor to conform with the evidence (R. 576-77). 
'The trial court granted the State's motion and denied defendant's 
motion (R. 577-78). The jury convicted defendant of all four 
charges, and the court sentenced him to serve three months in 
jail for the criminal mischief conviction; six months in jail for 
the interference with a peace officer conviction, and no more 
than five years in the Utah State Prison for each of the assault 
by a prisoner convictions, all terms to be served concurrently 
(R. 261-65) . The court then stayed the prison and jail terms for 
everything but the criminal mischief conviction and placed 
defendant on 36 months' probation (id.). 
On appeal, defendant challenges all of his convictions 
except the one for criminal mischief. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
In July 1992, Deputy Charles Haussler worked for the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office and had been a deputy for over 
eighteen years (R. 367). On July 14, 1992, he was part of the 
peak deployment squad, which worked between 5:00 p.m. until 2:00 
a.m. when the majority of offense reports were made and therefore 
handled a larger number of calls than other shifts (R. 367-68) . 
At 11:28 p.m., Deputy Haussler received a call from dispatch 
about a possib."e assault or domestic violence situation (R. 369-
4 
70). Dispatch informed him that an Ashley Read had reported 
seeing a male pull a female into a green pickup truck (R. 370, 
4 02). Dispatch was able to provide the make and model of the 
truck, defendant's name and address as the registered owner of 
the truck, and the location and direction of the truck when last 
seen (R. 370-71, 461). The deputy and other officers attempted 
to locate the truck but were unable to find it (R. 371, 461-63). 
Minutes later dispatch announced that it had received another 
report that defendant had taken Julie Pierce from her home and 
may be holding her against her will, and that she should be 
located (R. 372, 463). 
Deputy Haussler and Officer Christopher Bertram arrived at 
defendant's home in separate marked patrol cars, and the deputy 
spoke with defendant's teenage son, David, telling him why he was 
there and asking about defendant (R. 373-74, 369, 460, 464, 610). 
In response to the officer's questions, David explained that his 
father drove a green pickup truck, that Julie Pierce was his 
father's girlfriend, that both Julie and defendant were gone, and 
that he did not know where they were or when they would be back 
(R. 374, 622-23) . The officers left, only to be contacted by 
dispatch just before midnight and told that the truck had been 
oeen at defendant'«? home (R- 374). 
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Deputy Haussler and Officer Bertram returned to defendant's 
home shortly thereafter in separate marked patrol cars (R. 374-
75, 403, 452). Shawn Sisneros, a dispatcher for the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, was riding with Bertram that night and 
remained in the car where he was able to watch as events unfolded 
(R. 525-26) . Both Haussler and Bertram were in uniform and had 
their guns securely holstered (R. 376, 460, 466, 529). Neither 
officer remembered having a nightstick with him at the time, and 
Haussler could not remember having a flashlight (R. 376, 425, 
451, 466-68). Haussler led the way to the front door of the 
house, which was open (R. 375-76, 404, 464, 468). The officers 
could see defendant's son, his teenage daughter, Cara, and a man 
they believed to be defendant, based on information they received 
from dispatch and from defendant's son, sitting in the front room 
(R. 376-77, 452, 468-69,*613). Haussler noticed that defendant 
was holding a can of beer, appeared bleary-eyed and was 
noticeably intoxicated (R. 11, 377-78). While standing on the 
porch, Deputy Haussler saw a shadow and heard someone else moving 
in the hallway behind the front room (R. 378, 404-05). 
Deputy Haussler explained who he was and that he wanted to 
talk about a domestic violence complaint (R. 378-79, 470-71, 
507). Given the dispatch repoi^, defendant's intoxicated 
b 
condition, and the presence of the teenagers and a fourth person 
in the house, Deputy Haussler decided to talk with defendant in 
open surroundings to avoid any perception of intimidation, 
eliminate the chances of any involvement with anyone else, and 
separate defendant from Julie if she were in the house (R. 380, 
439). From the front porch, Deputy Haussler asked defendant to 
step outside so they could speak with him (R. 378-79, 471). 
Despite knowing why the officers were there and what they wanted 
to talk about (R. 378-79, 406, 623-25), defendant refused to come 
out, stating, "Fuck you" (R. 379, 405-06, 471). The deputy made 
the request several times, with defendant refusing each time in 
vulgar and obscene terms (R. 379-80, 406, 471-72, 496-98). 
Finally, the officers proceeded through the open doorway to 
either side of defendant (R. 380, 472, 499). As he went through 
the door, Officer Bertram saw a female in her early thirties 
standing "back in the hallway area" (R. 473) . When each man took 
hold of one of defendant's arms, and defendant immediately began 
thrashing his arms and moving around to try to avoid the 
officers' grasps (R. 380-81, 472). He continued flailing while 
yelling obscenities at the officers as they helped him to the 
front door (R. 381-82, 411, 413, 473, 529). Defendant's physical 
and verbal resistance continued outside, and his use of 
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obscenities escalated in content and volume, causing Deputy 
Haussler to change his mind about talking to defendant on the 
porch (R. 381-84, 474). Instead, the officer decided to conduct 
the investigation at his patrol car (R. 382) . He placed 
defendant in a control hold--pulling his arm behind his back and 
up toward his neck--and continued to his car (R. 382-83, 414). 
Because the hold leaves a person off balance, it permits the 
officer to gain control of the person with a minimum amount of 
force (R. 383, 422-23) . Having been trained in how and when to 
appropriately use the hold, the officer was able to accomplish it 
without an unnecessary amount of force (R. 383-84) . However, 
defendant's frantic struggles continued, and the hold did nothing 
to quiet defendant's yelling, which drew the attention of the 
neighbors (R. 384, 474-75, 513-14). Both officers repeatedly 
ordered defendant to "calm down" and explained that they only 
wanted to talk to him, but defendant refused to comply (R. 3 85-
86, 474). 
When they reached the patrol car, Deputy Haussler bent 
defendant over the hood of the car to keep him from falling or 
running (R. 382-84, 474). Defendant continued screaming 
obscenities and yelling at his daughter and his neighbors to get 
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a camera because "they are beating me like Rodney King" (R. 384, 
417-18, 476-78, 501, 514, 530-31). 
Once against the car, defendant immediately began kicking 
wildly behind him, striking Deputy Haussler with his feet several 
times, while continuing his verbal abuse of the officers (R. 384, 
530). Deputy Haussler restrained defendant by holding his torso 
to the hood of the car, and continued to tell him to calm down so 
they could talk, having to raise his voice to be heard above 
defendant's yelling (R. 384-85, 415-16, 513-14). By this point, 
the deputy had decided that he could not let defendant return to 
the house until he knew what the situation was between defendant 
and Julie (R. 415). Defendant continued forcibly resisting the 
officer, and the officer finally told defendant that he was under 
arrest (R. 385-86, 453, 474-77). Defendant's resistance did not 
end, however, and he physically fought against being handcuffed 
(R. 530-31). The evidence was undisputed that the officers did 
not hit or strike defendant up to this point and did not use any 
weapons of any sort on him (R. 386, 476, 530, 538, 626-27). 
During this time, defendant's teenage daughter, Cara, was 
screaming at the officers, asking why they were taking defendant 
and if he was under arrest (R. 613, 615, 643). She ultimately 
retrieved a camera and took pictures (R. 387, 642-43) , However, 
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she insisted on getting close to the men in the process (R. 385, 
418, 477-78, 532-33, 628). The officers did not care about the 
pictures, but were concerned about her continued proximity to the 
volatile situation (R. 418, 441, 502, 545, 643, 652). They gave 
her numerous verbal warnings to move back and stop interfering, 
but she continued to present a problem to the officers (R. 3 85, 
418, 476, 478, 532-33, 615, 643). After giving several 
ineffective warnings to move away and cautioning her that she 
would be arrested if she continued to disobey, Officer Bertram 
placed her under arrest for interfering (R. 387, 478-79, 515, 
533-34, 644) .2 Cara immediately began fighting and screaming to 
defendant not to let them take her (R. 387, 479, 515, 533-34). 
While Officer Bertram was with Cara, Deputy Haussler put 
defendant in the front passenger seat of his patrol car, buckled 
the seat belt, closed the locked front door, and went to assist 
Bertram (R. 3 86-87). When Cara started screaming, defendant 
began to yell, kick and struggle against his restraints, damaging 
the inside of the patrol car in the process (R. 420, 534) . He 
2Cara's brother, David, picked up the camera and proceeded 
to take whatever pictures he wanted from the front porch, without 
comment or concern from the officers (R. 615-LC, 618, 627-28). 
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was ultimately able to release the seat belt and open the car 
door (R. 388, 402, 480, 534-35). 
Sisneros, who had witnessed the events from Officer 
Bertram's patrol car, saw defendant's attempts to leave the 
patrol car and decided to help the officers (R. 481-82, 535). He 
ran to the patrol car and attempted to grab defendant's legs as 
defendant tried to climb out of the car (R. 388, 421, 482, 535). 
However, it was difficult for him to maintain his hold because 
defendant kept flailing and kicking, striking him in the chest 
and arms (R. 389, 535) . 
Once Cara was handcuffed, Deputy Haussler noticed the 
struggle between Sisneros and defendant (R. 388-89, 479-80). He 
returned to his car to help Sisneros and was kicked in the chest 
by defendant (R. 389). The officer then climbed into the rear 
seat of the car, avoiding the front seat because of his big 
build--6f6ff tall and 285 to 290 pounds--and the position of the 
steering wheel (R. 389-90, 412, 423). Deputy Haussler grabbed 
defendant under his arms and attempted to pull him back into an 
upright seated position in the front seat (R. 389-90, 480-81, 
535). Officer Bertram instructed Sisneros to take care of Cara 
near Deputy Haussler's car while he went to help Haussler put 
defendant back in the car (R. 389, 422, 482, 537). Bertram 
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immediately took defendant's legs in both his arms and hugged 
them to his chest to keep them still, repeatedly ordering 
defendant to calm down and stop kicking (R. 482-83) . Defendant 
continued struggling, yelled for pictures to be taken because he 
was being treated like Rodney King, and shouted profanities at 
the officers, yelling at them to leave his daughter alone (R. 
483, 514, 646) . He managed to free one of his legs, drew it 
towards his chest, then kicked Officer Bertram, striking him in 
his chest and knocking him to the ground (R. 390, 483, 516). 
Officer Bertram suffered minimal injury despite the force of the 
kick because of the bulletproof vest he was wearing (R. 483-84) . 
Officer Bertram again grabbed defendant's legs, this time 
pulling him out of the car onto the gravel road (R. 390, 484). 
Defendant immediately rolled to his stomach and got up on his 
knees while yelling non-stop profanities (R. 484). Bertram held 
him to the ground by holding onto his legs until Deputy Haussler 
was able to get out of the car and take his place (R. 484). 
Bertram then tried to get defendant down on his stomach, 
succeeding only after several orders (R. 485). Bertram sat on 
defendant's rear, placing one knee and shin behind him across 
defendant's thighs to minimize defendant's kicking (R. 485-86, 
512, 517). Meanwhile, Deputy Haussler was able to put a leg 
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restraint on defendant to prevent him from kicking or escaping 
(R. 391-92, 397, 486-87, 548-49). The officers then picked 
defendant off the ground, sat him back in the front seat of the 
car, and belted him in (R. 397, 486-87). Although defendant 
continued to try to get out of the car thereafter, he was not 
successful (R. 397, 487). 
At some point that night, each officer spoke with the 
victim, who was somewhere in the house when the officers arrived 
and with defendant's son by the time defendant was placed in the 
patrol car for a second time (R. 439-40, 618) . Deputy Haussler 
and Sisneros then took defendant to the jail, stopping first at 
the hospital to have a cut on defendant's temple and some 
abrasions treated (R. 433-34, 549). Defendant was booked on 
several charges, including assault, resisting arrest, disorderly 
conduct, public intoxication, and assault by a prisoner (R. 11). 
The prosecutor ultimately filed only four charges (R. 6-8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The lawfulness of the order required for a 
conviction for interfering with an officer, as well as the 
lawfulness of the arrest necessary for a conviction for assault 
by a prisoner, should not be determined simply by the alleged 
illegality of the officers' prior entry into defendant's home. 
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Instead, case law provides that the situation be reviewed to 
determine whether there existed objective indicia indicating that 
the officers were acting within the scope of their authority. If 
so, defendant has no legal right to resist the officers, and the 
officers' order as well as defendant's arrest should be deemed 
"lawful" for purposes of the charges for which defendant stands 
convicted. Public policy supports this broad interpretation of 
"lawful" as used in the statutes with which defendant was 
charged. 
Alternatively, defendant's actions between the allegedly 
illegal entry and his arrest support new criminal charges 
separate and distinct from the officers' entry, rendering the 
legality of the entry inconsequential to the lawfulness of the 
arrest. Consequently, his arrest was lawful, and his challenge 
to his convictions for assault by a prisoner should be rejected. 
Point II: Because the lawfulness of defendant's arrest is 
based on a review of objective factors under the circumstances of 
each case, the trial court did not err in submitting the question 
to the jury by means of jury instructions which accurately stated 
the relevant law. The instructions were both helpful to the jury 
and beneficial to defendant, who had initially requested them. 
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Moreover, the question of whether the officers had probable 
cause to arrest defendant is a mixed one of law and fact, making 
it one for the jury. Defendant contested .the State's evidence 
relative to the possible bases for his arrest, thereby justifying 
submission to the jury of the question of whether the officers 
had probable cause to arrest defendant. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE LAWFULNESS OF THE OFFICERS' ORDER AND DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST IS DETERMINED BY THE EXISTENCE OF OBJECTIVE 
INDICIA SUGGESTING THAT THE OFFICERS WERE ACTING WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY, AND THAT INDICIA WAS 
PRESENT IN THIS CASE; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S 
INTERVENING ILLEGAL ACTS RENDER ANY ILLEGALITY IN THE 
OFFICERS' ENTRY INTO HIS HOME INCONSEQUENTIAL TO HIS 
CONVICTIONS FOR ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 
Defendant claims that because the offense of interference 
with an officer requires the State to prove that the officers 
issued a "lawful order", and the offense of assault by a prisoner 
requires that he be in custody pursuant to a "lawful arrest", 
that the officers' allegedly illegal warrantless entry into his 
home prevents the State from establishing the requisite "lawful" 
elements of the offenses and requires reversal of his 
convictions. Appellant's Br. at 14, 15, 25-27. In other words, 
defendant interprets the statutes as providing that, where the 
15 
officers violate a constitutional or statutory provision sr.ch as 
the Fourth Amendment, he is free to ->ynore or actively resist or 
assault the officers without fear of prosecution under these 
statutes. However, defendant's position does not comport with 
either the law or the policy applicable to this situation.3 
State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 569-70 (Utah 1991), 
involved a defendant's resistance of an officer's efforts to 
arrest him following the officer's attempt to conduct what was 
later found to be an illegal search. The Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the law in this jurisdiction, determined that there was 
no common law right to resist an illegal arrest and no right to 
resist under either the interference with an officer statute or 
the assault on an officer statute, and affirmed defendant's 
conviction of interfering with an officer. Id. at 574-76. In 
Gardiner, the officer arrived at a business location to 
investigate a party and encountered Gardiner at the door. Id. at 
3The State below responded to defendant's probable cause and 
exigent circumstances argument (R. 572-74) (a copy of the 
argument and ruling is attached in addendum B). The State does 
not waive the argument that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed simply because it does not reiterate it 
here. The trial court found it unnecessary to rule on the 
argument, and this Court need not reach it because, under the 
analysis set forth herein, the legality of the officers' entry 
into defendant's home is inconsequential to his challenged 
convictions. 
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569. The officer stated that he intended to check the building 
'for minors, and, when he could not produce the search warrant 
demanded by Gardiner, Gardiner aggressively blocked his entrance. 
Id. The officer pushed Gardiner, who responded by punching the 
officer in the face. Id. A fight ensued and, during the 
struggle, the officer informed Gardiner that he was under arrest. 
Id. However, Gardiner refused to stop fighting and again 
attacked the officer. Id. Gardiner was convicted of assault on 
a peace officer and interference with a peace officer under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4 and 76-8-305 (1990). IcL. at 569-70. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that, regardless of the illegality 
of the officer's attempt to conduct a warrantless search of the 
premises, Gardiner committed the charged crimes when he 
physically fought with the officer before and during the 
officer's attempt to place him under arrest. Id. at 574-75. The 
court rejected defendant's attempts to justify his actions 
against the officer, finding no basis in either statute to 
justify Gardiner's resistance to the illegal search or to the 
officer's subsequent efforts to arrest him. Id. 
After the offenses in Gardiner were committed, the 
interference with an officer statute was amended. Defendant in 
this case was charged under a new subsection which provides: 
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A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care 
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person 
or another and interferes with the arrest or detention 
by: 
• • • 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to 
perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; 
and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest 
or detention . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). Addendum A. Defendant contends 
that the addition of the requirement of a "lawful order" renders 
the decision in Gardiner inapplicable and requires that the State 
establish the legality of the underlying warrantless entry before 
defendant's subsequent resistance to the officers' actions and 
orders will violate the statute. 
In State v. Smoot, 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3-4 (Utah App. June 
20, 1996), the defendant * was convicted of, among other things, 
interfering with an officer as set forth in the Salt Lake City 
ordinances. The ordinance includes three sections, one of which 
requires "a lawful command of a police officer[.]//4 Id. at 7. 
4The charged ordinance provided, in relevant part: 
Everv person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who: 
A. ALtempts by means of any threat, force or violence to 
deter, interfere with or prevent a police officer . . . from 
perrc .ning any official ducy imposed upon such officer . . . 
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on 
This Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between the 
sections in order to interpret them. Id. at 8 n.8. Relying 
Gardiner, this Court noted that any right to resist must be found 
in the charging statutes, then found that the inquiry relevant to 
the charged ordinance was whether the officers were acting within 
the scope of their authority. Id. at 6-7. The same inquiry, 
therefore, applies in the context of the interference statute. 
To determine whether an officer acted within the scope of his 
authority, this Court in Smoot looked to ''objective indicia of 
how the officer is perceived." Id. at 7. This includes such 
facts as "whether or not the officer was in uniform and on duty, 
whether the defendant knew he or she was an officer, and whether 
the defendant knew that he or she was being arrested." Id. 
Where the relevant objective indicia are present and suggest that 
the officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority, 
no right to resist exists. Id. This is so even where the 
by law; or 
B. Wilfully resists, physically delays or physically 
obstructs a police officer . . . or fails to comply with a 
lawful command of a police officer . . .in the discharge or 
attempt to discharge any official duty of such officer; or 
C. Knowingly resists by the use of force or violence any 
police officer . . . while performing an official duty. 
Smoot. 293 Uta>^  Adv. Rep. at 7 (quoting Salt Lake City Code 
section 11.04.030) (emphasis adder!) . 
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officers are acting without a legal ground, because the 
illegality of an officer's action does net justify a defendant's 
resistance. JJSL.; £v;k. also Gardiner/ 814 P. 2d at 574. 
Accordingly, in this case, defendant's strict interpretation 
of the requirement that the officers' actions be "lawful" must be 
rejected in favor of the broader interpretation called for in 
Gardiner and Smoot—in determining whether the defendant's 
actions toward the officers violates the two charged statutes, 
the officers' actions must be "lawful" in the sense that the 
objective indicia provide the perception that the officers were 
acting within the scope of their authority, thus giving defendant 
np right to disobey, resist or assault the officers. 
Here, both officers drove up in marked cars, were in 
uniform, identified themselves as officers, and demonstrated that 
they were on duty by explaining that they were conducting an 
investigation into a domestic violence report and wanted to speak 
to defendant about it (R. 376, 378-79, 460, 466, 470-71, 507, 
529). Defendant already knew from his earlier conversation with 
his son that the officers wanted to speak to him about what had 
happened earlier with Julie (R. 378-79, 406, 623-25) . Further, 
when the officers each took one of defendant's arms and escorted 
him outside and to the driveway, repeatedly tel"* ing him that they 
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only want to talk with him (R. 380-82, 385-86), their actions 
objectively appear designed to accomplish, without unnecessary 
force, what they had explained was their purpose--detaining 
defendant in order to speak with him about the domestic violence 
complaint. These circumstances objectively establish that the 
officers were acting within the scope of their authority--giving 
defendant no basis upon which to resist or disobey the officers--
and should render the officers' actions "lawful" within the 
meaning of both the assault by a prisoner and the interference 
with an officer statutes. Cf. Gardiner. 814 P.2d at 574-75; 
Smoot. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7. 
This interpretation finds support in public policy as well. 
Defendant's position would permit him to do any criminal act 
after a police illegality, so long as it is connected in some 
form to the chain of events started by the police misconduct, yet 
escape liability for assault by a prisoner or interference with 
an officer. For example, defendant's position, as a matter of 
public policy, would permit a suspect to actively resist and/or 
physically disrupt a search using any force available as long as 
the search warrant was ultimately found to be defective. Such a 
result is the exact common law approach rejected in Gardiner. 
Moreover, this situation involved a domestic violence 
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investigation. The legislature'n enactment of numerous domestic 
violence statutes in recent yea demonstrates a recognition of 
the seriousness and pervasivenei.? of domestic violence and its 
effects, as well as the cycliccl nature of such a crime. Cf. 
State v. Farrow. 292 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24-25 (Utah App. June 13, 
1996) (addressing the context, legislative intent and public 
policy issues related to domestic violence legislation). It also 
demonstrates society's interest, in protecting the victim and 
stopping the abuse. Id. at 24-25 (identifying the overwhelming 
concern for the victim and upholding a warrantless arrest of a 
suspect sixteen days following the last reported abuse). This 
concern speaks against any interpretation of the statutes which 
would minimize defendant's accountability for his acts of 
interfering with a domestic violence investigation. 
Use of a broad interpretation of the "lawful" requirement 
does not rob defendant of his ability to challenge the strict 
legality of the officers' actions. It simply requires that he do 
so within the confines of the judicial system at a later point 
and accept the appropriate legal remedy instead of creating a 
remedy on his own. See Gardiner. 814 P.2d at 572. Defendant's 
more strict interpretation would permit him to make his own 
determination in the heat of the moment as to the constitutional 
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or statutory legality of the officers' actions and to disobey or 
resist the officers without violating the statutes clearly meant 
to deal with such action--assault by a prisoner and interference 
with an officer. This is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's 
declaration that ''question [s] of legality must be determined in 
subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street." Id. at 574. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized, in today's world, 
individuals may legally challenge perceived illegalities in the 
actions of officers and, if any are found, may pursue the 
appropriate remedy in the courts. Id. at 572. 
Alternatively, should this Court require that the officers' 
actions be "lawful" in the strict constitutional and statutory 
sense urged by defendant and finds that the officers' entry into 
defendant's home in this case was unlawful, the determination 
would not impact on defendant's two felony convictions for 
assault by a prisoner because, contrary to defendant's position, 
his arrest would be unaffected by any illegality in the officers' 
prior entry into his home.5 
5The misdemeanor conviction for interference with a police 
officer would likely be lost under the alternative analysis 
outlined hereafter. 
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Despite defendant's assertion to the contrary, defendant was 
arrested at Deputy Haussler's patrol car after the officers had 
escorted him out of the house (R. 384-85, 453, 530). At that 
time, defendant actively resisted Deputy Haussler's attempts to 
arrest and cuff him (R. 530-31). The trial court found that 
there were a number of "alternative theories for the lawfulness 
of this arrest[,]" essentially ruling that the arrest was 
separate from any alleged illegality surrounding the entry into 
defendant's home (R. 578). This ruling finds support in case law 
providing that an illegal entry or a prior illegality by officers 
does not affect the subsequent arrest of defendant or use of 
evidence revealed after the illegality where there is an 
intervening illegal act by the suspect. See State v. Wagstaff. 
846 P.2d 1311, 1312-13 (Utah App.) (defendant's actions in 
"removing and swallowing a bag [illegally] seized by police 
officers supported a new criminal charge [tampering with 
evidence] that was distinct and separate from the prior illegal 
seizure[,]" rendering the legality of the seizure 
"inconsequential" to the tampering conviction), cert, denied. 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); see also United States v. Waupekenay. 973 
F.2d 1533, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1992) (where the suspect began his 
assault on officers after the officers had unlawfully entered his 
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home, the assault was an independent illegal offense, and 
evidence of the assault was not tainted by the illegal entry); 
People v. Klimek. 101 Ill.App.3d 1, 6, 56 111.Dec. 403, 408, 427 
N.E.2d 598, 603 (1981) (assault in defendant's home on officers 
who attempted to investigate complaint of disorderly conduct); 
Commonwealth v. Saia. 372 Mass. 53, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1977) 
(assault in defendant's home on officers who attempted to 
investigate disturbance complaint); State v. Burger, 55 Or.App. 
712, 639 P.2d 706, 707-08 (1982) (assault in defendant's home on 
officer who sought to investigate defendant's suspicious 
activity); State v, MiskimiriS, 435 N.W.2d 217, 221-22 (S.D. 1989) 
(assault with a shotgun in defendant's home on police who entered 
in attempt to serve an arrest warrant); cf. Brown v. State, 575 
So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. App. 1991) (in affirming defendant's 
conviction where defendant was arrested without probable cause 
and cocaine taken from him was illegally seized, the court 
stated, "Once the officer had taken the evidence into his 
custody, the defendant was not entitled to remove it--whether or 
not the underlying seizure was illegal."); State v. Combs. 394 
N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn- App. 1986) (an illegal vehicle stop did 
not warrant suppression of evidence of crimes committed in 
response to the stop--assault, obstructing legal process and 
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fleeing police officer), rev'd on other grounds. 398 N.W.2d 563 
(Minn. 1987). 
Here, regardless of what he was eventually charged with, 
defendant's actions between the officers' entry and his arrest 
amounted, at least, to assault, resisting arrest, intoxication, 
and disorderly conduct. Any one of these violations would 
constitute an intervening illegal act which insulates his arrest 
from any illegality in the officers' entry into his home. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE LAWFULNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ARREST TURNS ON A 
REVIEW OF OBJECTIVE FACTORS PURSUANT TO POINT I, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE QUESTION TO THE 
JURY; FURTHER, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE OFFICERS HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT WAS FOR THE JURY TO 
DECIDE BECAUSE THE RELEVANT FACTS WERE DISPUTED 
Defendant submitted proposed jury instructions below 
relating to when an officer may arrest a person, when probable 
cause for an arrest exists, and on what basis a person may be 
arrested for disorderly conduct and intoxication (R. 185, 188-
90). These instructions relate to the determination of whether 
there was a lawful arrest upon which the charge of assault by a 
prisoner could be based. Defendant's basic instructions were 
given, with the exception of his probable cause instruction (R. 
225-28) (a copy of the instructions given by the trial court is 
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attached in addendum C). Just before the instructions were given 
to the jury at the end of the trial, defendant objected to the 
giving of the instructions, arguing that, although their content 
was unobjectionable, they involved questions of law which the 
trial court should have decided before submitting the case to the 
jury (R. 660-61) . 
This is consistent with defendant's position in Point I, 
supra. that the lawfulness of the arrest is a narrow question of 
statutory or constitutional lawfulness which turns on the 
legality of the warrantless entry into his home and was a 
determination to be made by the trial court prior to submission 
of the case to the jury. However, the lawfulness of the arrests 
depends upon the objective indicia of how the officers were 
perceived, and the question is properly given to the jury to 
determine the existence of the indicia under the facts as they 
find them. The trial court's rejection of defendant's challenge, 
although lacking in detail, reflects an apparent agreement that 
the lawfulness of the arrest presented a broader, objective 
question more properly determined by the jury (R. 661). 
To establish the trial court's duty to decide this issue, 
defendant cites to cases involving the court's responsibility to 
determine the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility of 
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evidence. Appellant's Br. at 28-29. However, neither 
jurisdiction nor admissibility are at issue here. 
Instead, this Court should find that the trial court 
appropriately submitted the question of the lawfulness of the 
arrest to the jury for the reasons set forth in Point I, supra. 
The lawfulness of the arrest requires an objective review of the 
facts, and the jury, as the fact finder, is in a position to make 
such an objective determination. The instructions presented 
accurate statements of the law and were helpful to the jury in 
providing additional information relevant to possible reasons for 
the parties' actions. The instructions were also beneficial to 
defendant in that they provided an additional set of 
requirements, increasing the possibility that the jury may find 
the evidence sufficiently lacking to warrant acquittal. 
Moreover, the jury's determination of the lawfulness of the 
arrest is justified because of the factual disputes below. 
The issue of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Terry v. Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 320 
n.15 (Utah 1979). The jury is permitted to decide such 
questions, although it is bound to follow the law as stated by 
the trial court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10(2) (1995). Only 
where the relevant facts are undisputed is the determination of 
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probable cause a question of law for the court to determine. 
Terry, 605 P.2d at 320. 
The facts defendant claims are undisputed are not wholly 
determinative of whether the officers had probable cause to 
arrest defendant. Because of the dispute surrounding some of the 
relevant facts not mentioned by defendant, the question of the 
lawfulness of his arrest was appropriately given to the jury, and 
defendant's claim fails.6 
The State offered testimony from Deputy Haussler concerning 
not only his believe that defendant was intoxicated but also the 
basis for that belief, including an elaboration on defendant's 
irrational and beligerant physical and verbal reaction to the 
officers throughout the incident (R. 377-79 381-82, 384-85, 388-
91) .7 Officer Bertram explained that, while he was trying to 
6Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to establish intoxication or disorderly conduct; he 
merely claims that the facts underlying the offenses are 
undisputed. Appellant's Br. at 29-30. Consequently, the State 
does not attempt to establish the sufficiency of the evidence for 
either offense. 
instruction number 26 (R. 228) on intoxication provided: 
You are instructed that a person may be charged 
with intoxication if he is under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or any substance to a degree that 
the person may endanger himself or another, in a public 
place or in a private place where he unreasonably 
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find defendant after the first call from dispatch, he was stopped 
by the witnesses who had called in the assault, and they told him 
that defendant was intoxicated and had struck the victim (R. 462-
63). On the other hand, defendant's son testified that he'd seen 
his father drunk before and, although he had been drinking that 
night, he wasn't intoxicated, "he was fine" (R. 624-25). 
Defendant also established that he was given no sobriety test, 
and argued in closing the unreliability of Deputy Haussler's 
observations and the insufficiency of the evidence regarding 
intoxication (R. 458, 692-93). Clearly, a factual dispute 
existed concerning intoxication. 
The evidence relating to the offenses of disorderly conduct 
and interference with a peace officer8 overlaps and was clearly 
contested.9 All three of the State's witnesses present during 
disturbs other persons. 
8Although defendant challenges only the offenses of 
intoxication and disorderly conduct as bases upon which his 
arrest could be found, the jury was also instructed on the charge 
of interfering with a peace officer and may have based its 
finding of a lawful arrest on that charge (r. 568). Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-6 (1995) (notice of the basis for the arrest is not 
required when "the person being arrested is actually engaged in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense"). 
9The disorderly conduct instruction (R. 227) provided: 
You are instructed that a person may be charged with 
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the incident testified that defendant was struggling, yelling, 
kicking, and generally resisting both his detention and his 
arrest (R. 384-86, 416, 453, 474-76, 499, 513-14, 530-31). Both 
Deputy Haussler and Officer Bertram expressly remembered 
defendant's loud use of vulgar and obscene language, beginning 
when they requested that he step outside and continuing 
throughout the remainder of the incident (R. 379, 382, 385-86, 
405-06, 471-72, 474, 476-77, 514). In contrast, defendant's 
theory of the case clearly illustrates that these facts were in 
dispute: he claimed that the officers overreacted in their 
involvement with him and then wattempted to justify their 
behavior . . . by accusing [him] of assaultive behavior against 
them" (R. 594). Defendant's position that he did not react as 
disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He intends to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof; 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public 
place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
The instruction regarding interference with a peace officer 
included the 3lements set forth, supra, at Point I. 
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the officers described was supported at trial by testimony from 
'his son and daughter. Defendant's son testified that defendant 
"did not say one swear words [sic] until . . . they slammed Cara 
on the hood of the car" (R. 625) , that defendant did not struggle 
or resist but "just like kind of [stood] there with his arm being 
twisted" (R. 627) , and that defendant did not kick at anyone (R. 
621, 627). Defendant's daughter testified that defendant never 
refused the officers' requests that he come outside (R. 640-41), 
and that he did not struggle or yell about anything except the 
pain in his arm until she was arrested (R. 642). There is no 
question that a dispute existed as to facts relevant to both 
disorderly conduct and interference with a peace officer. 
Because there was a dispute as to relevant facts, the finder 
of fact was required to determine, in light of the evidence and 
surrounding circumstances, whether the officers had probable 
cause to arrest defendant. See Terry, 605 P.2d at 320-21 
(discussing reasonableness and probable cause to detain and 
arrest in conjunction with a merchant). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions. 
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76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C1953,764-1Q2J, enacted by L 
1974.ch.a2.ia3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYRS 




Assault against pesos officer. 
fttii section end I 76-6-102.4 do not pn>-
aeribe identical conduct when the assault fa 
agsinst a peace officer. Tfee statutes apply to 
different dsases of persons, the former apply. 
jog ic tnf pencil* end the letter epplyinf to 
•any prisoner* Bute % Duran, 772 P.2d 9ft2 
(Utah CtApp. 1989). 
Evidence of assault. 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the 
videotape of all bookings, including the define. 
slant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if 
there was no request to retain it, and the 
defendant sought dismisssl of the charge that 
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police 
officer, because there was no showing that loss 
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue 
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in 
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez, 
761 R2d 577 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
••"•Sufficient. 
Jurj verdict, implicitly rejecting etetutory 
defenses of self-defense and defense of habits* 
tion, was supported by the evidence. State v. 
Duran, 772 E2d 982 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah 
CtApp. 1994). 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, he damages or de-
stroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) he intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of 
another and thereby: 
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or 
impairment of any public utility service; 
(c) hie intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of 
another, including the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
or 
(d) he recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object 
at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, 
railway car or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a felony of the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (lXb) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000 value; 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $500; 
(iii) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $250; and 
(iv) class C misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause loss of less than $250. 
76-6-106. Criminal m i s c h i e f 
History: C. 1953,7*4-106, enacted by L. 
1*73, eh. 1*6,1 76-6406; 1*92, ch. 14,1 1. 
Amendment Notts. — The 1*92 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1*92, added "including 
the use of graffiti ma denned in Subjection 
76-11-20(2); or* to the end of Subeection (lXc>, 
made etyliatic change* in Subsection* (2Xa) 
and (2Xb>, and added the numerical designa-
tiont and made related change* in Subeection 
(2XeX 
CroM-Referencaa. — Aircraft, tampering 
with, | 2-1-30. 
Airport* and equipment, tampering with for-
bidden, | 2-1-31. 
Damaging or destroying mining notice*, 
f 40-1-U. 
livestock Brand and Anti-theft Act, Title 4, 
Chapter 24. 
Monument* of official aurveya, damaging or 
removing, f 76-8-415. 
Theft, | 76-6-404. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(S) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1953,76-8-305, enacted by L. as enacted by ( 76-8-305, relating to mterfer-
1981, ch. 62,1 1; 1990, ch. 274,1 1. ence with law enforcement official seeking to 
Repeals and Reenactmenta* — Lewi % detain intcrferor or another, and enacted 
1981, ch. 62, t 1 repealed former | 76-6-305, present ( 76-6-305. 





UzuMul eesui* rf praniees. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Former ( 76-8405 (L. 1973, ch. 196, f 76-8-
305), which made it unlawful to interfere inten-
tionally with recognized law enforcement offi-
cial aeekinf to detain interferes or another, 
regardleaa of whether there waa legal basis for 
arrest, waa unconstitutionally vague. State v. 
Bradahaw, 641 R2d 600 (Utah 1975). 
Lawful arreat 
University security officer who arrested stu-
dent in area where sole interests of university 
were location of fraternity and religious insti-
tute far students was not discharging, or at-
tempting to discharge, any duty of his office, 
and subsequent interference with arrest by 
fellow student was not resistance or obstruction 
of officer in discharge of duty. State ex rel 
Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 R2d 111 (1972). 
Peace officers* 
Game wardens were by law peace officers 
who had same power and followed same proce-
dure in making arrests as other peace officers. 
State v. Sandman, 4-Utah 2d 69,286 P.2d 1060 
(1955). 
Unlawful search of premises. 
Defendant's convictions of assaulting a peace 
officer and interfering with a peace officer were 
affirmed, where the officer was acting within 
the scope of his authority in responding to a 
complaint regarding a party where minors 
were consuming alcohol, even though his at-
tempted search of the premises was later found 
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HAVE TO TAKE A BREAK UNTIL Wl. *:ET A WITNESS. THIS IS NOT 
ONE OF THOSE LULLS IN THE TRIAL THAT I'M OBLIGATED TO 
ENTERTAIN YOU. IT WOULD NOT BE FUNNY. SO REMEMBER THE 
ADMONITION. DO NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH ANYONE, 
INCLUDING AMONG YOURSELVES. DO NOT FORM OR EXPRESS ANY 
OPINIONS OR CONCLUSIONS. AND WE'LL SEE YOU AS SOON AS WE 
HAVE A WITNESS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY EXITED THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE 
JURY HAS NOW EXITED. 
MR. MACK, YOU HAVE A MOTION? 
MR. MACK: I DO, JUDGE, BUT I NEED ABOUT 20 
MINUTES, I THINK. 
THE COURT: WHY? 
MR. MACK: WE CAN START. BECAUSE I THINK IT'S 
JUST GOING TO TAKE ME THAT TIME TO GET THROUGH IT. 
THE COURT: TWENTY MINUTES TO PRESENT A MOTION TO 
DISMISS? I LISTENED TO THE EVIDENCE. 
MR. MACK: I WILL TRY TO SPEED IT UP. 
YOUR HONOR, IT WOULD BE OUR MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGES OF ASSAULT AND TWO COUNTS OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 
AND ALSO THE CHARGE OF INTERFERING WITH A PEACE OFFICER 
MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST. 
PRISONER, AS DEFINED AT 75-65-101 AS PERTAINING 
TO THE STATUTE OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER RELEVANT TO 
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MR. GRIEGO, IS -IK CUSTODY PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL ARREST." 
THE PART THAT'S THE INTERFERENCE WITH AN ARRESTING OFFICER 
75-68-305 ALSO REQUIRES A LAWFUL ORDER MADE BY A PEACE 
OFFICER INVOLVING AN ARREST OR DETENTION. 
I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS, FIRST OF ALL, THE 
ASSAULT BY A PRISONER CHARGES THAT COUNT — I GUESS THOSE 
ARE COUNTS. 
THE COURT: 3 AND 4. 
MR. MACK: YES. 3 AND 4. IN THIS CASE, THE 
OFFICER IS ACTING ON DISPATCH INFORMATION AND SOME CONTACT 
WITH CITIZENS. THEY ULTIMATELY ARRIVE AT MR. GRIEGO'S 
HOUSE AND ENTER THAT HOUSE WITH NOTHING MORE THAN, AT MOST, 
REASONABLE SUSPICION. THEY DON'T HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
THEY DON'T HAVE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BOTH OF WHICH ARE 
REQUIRED FOR A WARRANTLESS ENTRY. 
WHEN THEY GET TO THE HOUSE, THE DOOR IS WIDE 
OPEN. THEY CAN SEE MR. GRIEGO, THEY CAN SEE HIS TWO KIDS. 
THERE IS SOME MENTION OF A SHADOW SIGHT OR SOME SOUND FROM 
ANOTHER PERSON, BUT THEY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN 
THAT. THEY DON'T EVEN KNOW WHO HE IS AT THAT TIME. AND 
BECAUSE HE REFUSES OR — WELL, WE HAVE HEARD DIFFERENT 
VERSIONS. HE EITHER SWEARS AT THEM AND/OR SAYS "WHY?" AND 
IS TOLD "BECAUSE I SAID SO," THEN SAYS "NO, I'M NOT COMING 
OUT," WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THEY COME IN AND DRAG HIM OUT. 
AND I WOULD SUBMIT THAT AT THAT TIME, HE'S UNDER 
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1 ARREST. BOTH OFFICERS HAUSSLER AND BERTRAM SAID THAT WHEN 
2
 HE WAS IN THE CONTROL HOLD AT THE CAR, THE FIGURE FOUR HOLD 
3 OR WHATEVER IT WAS, HE WAS NOT FREE TO LEAVE. HE WAS 
4 LEGALLY ARRESTED AT THAT POINT, WHETHER THEY HAD SAID THE 
5
 MAGIC WORDS OR PUT THE HANDCUFFS ON HIM. 
6 THE TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY HAUSSLER WAS THAT THAT 
* WAS DONE IN ONE FAIRLY CONTINUOUS ACTION FROM THE DOOR TO 
8
 THE HOOD OF THE CAR AND THE CUFFING. NOT THAT THAT MAKES 
9 ANY DIFFERENCE. I THINK THAT ONCE THEY CROSS THE THRESHOLD 
10 OF HIS HOUSE, THEY HAVE TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT 
11 CIRCUMSTANCES. AND, AGAIN, BECAUSE THEY DON'T KNOW WHO HE 
12 IS AT THAT POINT, THEY BARELY HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
13 AND I RELY ON STATE V. DEAVERS FOR THAT HOLDING. 
H I HAVE GOT A COPY FOR THE COURT, AND IF YOU WANT ME TO 
15 SPEED IT UP AND NOT TALK ABOUT THE CASE — 
16 THE COURT: I'LL READ IT. 
17 MR. MACK: — I WILL SUBMIT A COPY. THAT CASE 
18 INVOLVED A TERRY STOP, WHICH I THINK IS A MORE SERIOUS KIND 
19 OF SITUATION THAN WE HAVE GOING ON HERE. WE HAVE, DURING 
20 AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SITUATION. 
21 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, THERE IS NOTHING THAT THEY SEE AT THE 
22 TIME THAT THEY ARE AT THE DOORWAY THAT INDICATES ANYTHING 
23 LIKE THAT IS CONTINUING. THEY CAN'T JUST GO IN AND DRAG 
24 HIM OUT OF THE HOUSE. 
25 SIMILARLY, JUDGE, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
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1 INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER, COUNT 1, THE OFFICER, 
2
 DEPUTY HAUSSLER, WHO ACTUALLY MADE THE ARREST, SAYS THAT, 
3 WHEN MR. PARKER ASKED HIM WHY HE WAS ARRESTED, WHEN HE SAID 
4 THE WORDS "YOU*RE UNDER ARREST" AND PUT THE HANDCUFFS ON 
5
 MR. GRIEGC\ THAT HE WAS UNDER ARREST FOR INTOXICATION AND 
6 DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
7 WELL, INTOXICATION IS 76-9-701 AND GIVEN THE 
8
 FACTS THAT YOU HAVE HEARD IN THIS CASE, HE COULDN'T 
9 POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN PLACED — LEGALLY PLACED UNDER ARREST 
10 FOR INTOXICATION. HE'S IN A PRIVATE PLACE. HE'S, AT THAT 
11 POINT, CAUSING NO DISTURBANCE, UNTIL THEY CAUSE ONE TO 
12 HAPPEN. 
13 THERE IS NO DISTURBANCE. THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
14 IS 76-9-102. IF I CAN JUST TAKE A LOOK HERE-. OKAY. "A 
15 PERSON IS GUILTY OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT IF HE REFUSES TO 
16 COMPLY WITH A LAWFUL ORDER OF THE POLICE TO MOVE FROM A 
17 I PUBLIC PLACE." WE DON'T HAVE THAT HERE. THAT SECTION 
18 DOESN'T APPLY. 
19 IN PART B, INTENDING TO CAUSE PUBLIC 
20 INCONVENIENCE, ANNOYANCE OR ALARM, OR RECKLESSLY CREATING A 
21 RISK THEREOF." THEN THERE ARE FIVE THINGS. ENGAGING IN 
22 FIGHTING OR VIOLENT, TUMULTUOUS OR THREATENING WAY, HE 
23 MAKES UNREASONABLE NOISES IN A PUBLIC PLACE, HE MAKES 
24 UNREASONABLE NOISES IN A PRIVATE PLACE, CAN BE HEARD IN A 
25 PUBLIC PLACE AND ENGAGES IN ABUSIVE OR OBSCENE LANGUAGE OR 
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GESTURES IN k PUBLIC PLACE, OR HE OBSTRUCTS VEHICULAR OR 
PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC. 
THIS SITUATION ARISES BECAUSE THEY DRAG HIM OUT 
OF HIS HOUSE. THERE ISN'T DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND THEY 
DON'T CHARGE HIM WITH DISORDERLY CONDUCT, BUT THEY SAY 
THAT'S WHY HE'S UNDER ARREST. THEY SAID HE REFUSED TO 
COOPERATE WITH THEM, AND THAT WAS THE BASIS FOR ARRIVING, I 
GUESS, AT THE CHARGE ON THE CLAIMED CHARGE FOR ARREST OF 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
WITH RESPECT — I GUESS WE WOULD ALSO MAKE A 
MOTION WITH RESPECT TO COUNT 2 OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF. 
THE ESTIMATE IS $170. AND EVEN IF YOU DON'T REDUCE IT BY 
THE $77 LABOR THAT WAS ESTIMATED, IT'S NOT A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR. THEY DON'T HAVE IT THERE AND THAT SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED. 
BUT I THINK THE CASE LAW — BACK TO THE MORE 
SERIOUS CHARGES — IS VERY STRONGLY WORDED, VERY CLEAR, 
THAT WHAT THE OFFICERS DID HERE WAS IMPROPER. IT WAS AN 
ILLEGAL ARREST. AND A PERSON HAS THE RIGHT, I WOULD CLAIM, 
TO USE FORCE — I'M SORRY, I'M READING THE WRONG PLACE. A 
PERSON MAY FORCIBLY RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST BY A POLICE 
OFFICER. 
MR. PARKER WILL LIKELY CITE THE CASE OF STATE V. 
GARDNER, WHICH SAYS THAT YOU CANNOT ASSAULT A COP AND THEN 
GET AWAY WITH THE CHARGE OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER, A 
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CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. THAT CASE INVOLVED THAT TYPE OF A 
PROSECUTION. IT WAS A BAD SEARCH CASE THAT RESULTED IN 
CHARGES OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER, WHICH DOES NOT HAVE 
THE ELEMENT REQUIRING A LAWFUL ARREST. AND I THINK THAT 
WOULD DISTINGUISH IT FROM THIS CASE. HE COULD HAVE FILED 
IT THAT WAY. I SUGGESTED TO HIM LONG GO THAT HE MIGHT WANT 
TO DO THAT. BUT HE CHOSE NOT TO. AND I THINK, CLEARLY, 
HE'S STUCK WITH THE CHOICE HE'S MADE. 
BUT TO REITERATE, THERE IS NO LEGAL ARREST HERE, 
SO MR. GRIEGO COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PRISONER, AS DEFINED IN 
THE — 
THE COURT: LET ME ASK YOU THIS. COUNT 1, 
INTERFERING WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST IS 
A BIT OF A MISNOMER. IT DOESN'T HAVE TO BE A LAWFUL 
ARREST. WHAT IT HAS TO BE, AT A MINIMUM, IS AN ATTEMPT TO 
MAKE A DETENTION OF ANOTHER PERSON. SO THEY GO TO HIS 
HOUSE BECAUSE THEY THINK THERE IS A PROBLEM. SO THEY ARE 
IN THE PROCESS OF ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A DETENTION OF 
SOMEONE. 
WHEN THEY GO THERE, THEN HIS CONDUCT INTERFERES 
WITH THEIR ATTEMPT TO MAKE A DETENTION. HE THEN HAS 
INTERFERED WITH THE POLICE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST 
AND HE CAN BE ARRESTED FOR THAT. 
MR. MACK: BUT HE'S NOT. ACCORDING TO THE 
OFFICERS, HE'S NOT ARRESTED FOR THAT. HE'S ARRESTED FOR 
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INTOXICATION AND DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
THE COURT: BUT ISN'T THE QUESTION NOT WHETHER 
THEY PICKED THE RIGHT BASES TO HOLD HIM BUT WHETHER THEY 
HAD ANY BASES WHATSOEVER, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY 
ARTICULATE IT CORRECTLY? THEY DON'T EXPECT THESE FOLKS ARE 
LAWYERS OUT IN THE FIELD, DO THEY? AND JUST BECAUSE THEY 
PICK THE WRONG THING DOESN'T MEAN IT'S A BAD ARREST. 
MR. MACK: I AGREE, JUDGE, THEY HAD SOME RIGHT TO 
INVESTIGATE WHAT WAS GOING ON. BUT ONCE HE REFUSED TO 
COOPERATE WITH THEM, THEY HAVE ANOTHER MEANS AVAILABLE. 
THEY HAVE A VIEW OF THE WHOLE SCENE. NOTHING IS GOING ON 
THERE. 
THE COURT: WELL, NO, THERE IS THIS SHADOW OF A 
PERSON. NUMBER ONE, THEY HAVE A REPORT THAT THERE WAS SOME 
GOINGS ON OUTSIDE SOMEPLACE, AND THEN SUDDENLY THESE GOINGS 
ON, AS REPORTED TO THEM, ARE POSSIBLY GOING ON INSIDE. AND 
THEN THEY HAVE SOME VIEW OF A SHADOWY PERSON IN THE BACK. 
MR. MACK: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: ISN'T THAT ENOUGH THEN FOR THEM TO 
TAKE THE NEXT STEP AND SAY, "WE'RE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A 
DETENTION OF THIS PERSON. NOW, TALK TO US ABOUT THIS"? 
MR. MACK: I THINK A DETENTION — I DON'T THINK 
THE DETENTION HAS TO BE LAWFUL AND I THINK THAT THEIR 
APPROACH TO THAT DETENTION WAS NOT LAWFUL. I DON'T THINK 
THEY EXHAUSTED ALL LEGAL METHODS OF ACCOMPLISHING THAT. WE 
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KNOW THEY DIDN'T CALL — 
THE COURT: THE ONLY ADULT WHO IS THERE IS EITHER 
UNCOOPERATIVE OR, AT A MINIMUM, SILENT. 
BUT HE'S IN HIS HOUSE, AND THAT'S THE PROBLEM. 
HE'S ACROSS THE THRESHOLD. 
BUT IT'S THIS HOUSE THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS 
THE PLACE WHERE SOMEONE WAS POSSIBLY DOWN THERE AGAINST 
THEIR WILL. AND, INTERESTINGLY, THEY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO 
CALL OUT THE NAME "JULIE" OR IN ANY WAY FURTHER THAT PART 
OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
THEY ARE MAD BECAUSE HE'S TELLING THEM WHATEVER 
HE'S TELLING THEM AND THEY DON'T LIKE IT. THEY DRAG HIM 
OUT. EVEN AFTER THAT, THEY DON'T INTERVIEW THIS WOMAN. 
NEITHER HAUSSLER NOR BERTRAM TALKS TO THIS WOMAN TO 
ASCERTAIN ANY — 
THE COURT: WELL, BECAUSE THEY CAN'T EFFECTUATE 
THAT BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING, YOU KNOW, IF THEY TOOK YOUR 
APPROACH, THEY WOULD HAVE TO STAY OUTSIDE THAT DOOR, THEY 
CAN'T DO ANYTHING AND THEY COULD NOT FURTHER INVESTIGATE. 
MR. MACK: WELL, JUDGE, AT SOME POINT THEY COULD. 
HE WAS ULTIMATELY IN CUSTODY AND RESTRAINED. THE DOOR WAS 
OPEN. IF THE DOOR IS SHUT OR IF THEY HEARD SOMETHING ELSE 
THAT MIGHT HAVE ARISEN TO THE LEVEL — THEY WEREN'T EVEN 
P.C. YET, BUT THAT DOORWAY IS A WALL TO THEIR ENTRY, NO 
MATTER WHAT, UNLESS THEY HAVE GOT PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT DEALT WITH THE TERRY CASE 
WHICH IS A MORE HEIGHTENED SITUATION. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE LOOKING UPON THE ARREST AS 
CURING THEM AND IT COULD WELL BE THAT, IN EFFECT, THE 
ARREST WAS FOR THEIR INTERFERING WITH THEIR ABILITY TO 
ATTEMPT A DETENTION, WHICH TO ME IS JUST A GARBLED BUNCH OF 
WORDS, "INTERFERING WITH THEIR ATTEMPT TO INVESTIGATE." 
MR. MACK: I GUESS WE WOULDN'T COMPLAIN IF THAT 
WAS THE ONLY CHARGE LEFT STANDING, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: WELL, NO. BUT ONCE HE DOES THAT, 
THEN HE HAS — THERE IS AT LEAST A BASIS TO ARREST HIM FOR 
A VIOLATION OF THE LAW; I.E. THE VIOLATION BEING 
INTERFERING WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST. 
AND AS I SAY, IT'S A MISNOMER BECAUSE IT REALLY IS 
INTERFERING WITH AN OFFICER SEEKING TO EFFECT A DETENTION 
OF ANOTHER PERSON. 
MR. MACK: I SAY AGAIN, IT HAS TO BE A LEGAL 
DETENTION. AND I THINK THEY WERE WELL BEYOND THE SCOPE OF 
ANYTHING — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET ME HEAR FROM 
MR. PARKER. 
MR. PARKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THAT'S JUST SOMETHING TO CONSIDER. 
TO ME, THAT MAY NOT EVEN BE THE BASIS MR. PARKER RELIED 
UPON. 
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MR. PARKER: I THINK IT'S ONE OF THE SEVERAL 
BASES THAT CAN BE RELIED ON. THERE REALLY ARE SEVERAL OF 
THEM, IF WE ADOPTED THE MOST STRICT STANDARD FOR THE 
OFFICERS, AND THAT IS THAT THEY MUST HAVE HAD PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY HAD BOTH. 
THEY HAD, IF THE COURT RECALLS — AND AGAIN, 
WE'RE NOT TALKING WHAT HE HAS TO PROVE IN COURT. WE ARE 
TALKING ABOUT THE INFORMATION THEY HAD, GIVEN THEIR 
TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE. THIS MURRAY DISPATCHER HAD CALLED 
THEM AND SAID A WOMAN BY THE NAME OF JULIE HAS BEEN TAKEN 
FROM HER HOME, AND THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF 
THAT WOMAN, AND THAT THE PERSON WHO HAD TAKEN HER WAS THE 
DEFENDANT. 
THEY HAD RECEIVED ANOTHER CALL FROM A MR. ASHLEY, 
WHO TURNS OUT TO BE MS. ASHLEY READ, THAT THIS WOMAN WAS 
BEING HELD IN THIS PICKUP TRUCK. 
DEPUTY BERTRAM RECEIVED INFORMATION, APPARENTLY, 
FROM SOME OTHER PEOPLE WHO SAW THIS GREEN PICKUP TRUCK AND 
SAW THE MALE IN THE GREEN PICKUP TRUCK STRIKE THE FEMALE 
AND ALSO, APPARENTLY, TRIED TO APPROACH, AND TOLD THE 
OFFICERS THAT THE GUY WAS INTOXICATED. THEN THEY GET SOME 
LATER CALLS AND THEY GO TO THE HOUSE. OF COURSE, THE 
VEHICLE WAS NOT THERE. THERE IS ONLY ONE TEENAGER THERE. 
THEY GET SOME LATER CALL THAT THAT VEHICLE IS BACK AT THAT 
HOUSE AND THEY GO THERE AND THE VEHICLE IS THERE. 
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AND THE PERSON THAT WAS NOT THERE WHO NOW IS 
THERE, AT LEAST THE ADULT, IS THE DEFENDANT. AND THEN THEY 
SEE THIS SHADOW IN THE BACKGROUND. 
THERE WAS PROBABLE RIGHT THERE THAT ONE OF THE 
CRIMES, PUBLIC INTOXICATION — DEFENDANT SAYS IT HAS TO BE 
IN A PUBLIC PLACE. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN LONG FOUND TO BE 
IN A PUBLIC PLACE. DEPUTY HAUSSLER SAID THAT HE OBSERVED 
HIM THERE, HE LOOKED AND ACTED INTOXICATED EVEN BEFORE HE 
WENT IN THE DOOR. THEY WERE OUT THERE CAUSING THE 
DISTURBANCE, ASSAULTING THIS WOMAN. IT'S ACTUALLY ALSO AN 
ASSAULT. 
THE TESTIMONY FROM PEOPLE WHO STOPPED DEPUTY 
BERTRAM AND SAID THAT THEY SAW THE MAN HITTING THE WOMAN, 
COUPLED WITH THE OTHER INFORMATION IS ENOUGH PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THEM TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT FOR ASSAULT. 
NOW, THERE IS SOME SPECIFIC TIMES YOU CAN ARREST 
FOR MISDEMEANOR AND ONE OF THEM IS WHEN THERE IS GOING TO 
BE PHYSICAL DANGER, THAT SOMEONE ELSE CAN BE INJURED. YOU 
KNOW THAT WITHIN THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT CATEGORIES THERE ARE 
AT LEAST THREE NEW STATUTES EVEN REQUIRING THE OFFICERS TO 
MAKE AN ARREST. 
GIVEN THAT, GIVEN THE FACT THAT AS THEY WENT OUT 
TO THE HOUSE, THEY FIND A PERSON THAT'S UNCOOPERATIVE AND 
INTOXICATED, AND THEY SEE THE SHADOW IN THE BACKGROUND AND 
THEY TELL THE COURT THAT WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DO IS 
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SEPARATE THEM SO THEY CAN CONTINUE TO INVESTIGATE, THAT IS 
ONE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND TWO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY 
HAVE GOT TO GO IN THERE AND SEE WHAT HAPPENED TO THAT 
WOMAN. 
REALISTICALLY, WHAT WOULD ANYONE ELSE WANT THE 
OFFICERS TO DO? IF THEY GO GET A SEARCH WARRANT, THE WOMAN 
COULD BE KILLED IF SHE'S BEING ASSAULTED BETWEEN THE TIME 
OF THE WARRANT. SHE COULD HOLLER OUT, BUT IF THE DEFENDANT 
HAS ASSAULTED HER ALREADY, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT CHANCE 
THAT SHE'S NOT GOING TO SAY ANYTHING. WHAT ELSE ARE THEY 
GOING TO DO BESIDES TRY TO GET THE DEFENDANT AWAY AND BE 
ABLE TO TRY AND ELIMINATE HIS CONTROL OVER THIS WOMAN AND 
THEN TRY AND ASCERTAIN THE SITUATION? 
THEIR ACTIONS WERE VERY REASONABLE FOR ALL THOSE 
THINGS. BUT ALSO, AS THE COURT POINTS OUT, EVEN THOUGH 
THERE MAY BE A QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT AN ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION CAN BE PLACED IN A PRIVATE SETTING, IF THERE EVER 
IS ONE WHERE IT DOES APPLY, THIS CERTAINLY IS IT. THEY ARE 
CALLED THERE TO THE SCENE OF A CRIME. THEY CAN'T WALK 
AWAY. THERE IS SOME SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO A PERSON THAT 
THEY HAVE NOT SEEN AND CANNOT ASCERTAIN WHAT OCCURRED TO 
HER AND WHAT DID NOT. THEIR ACTION IN TAKING THE DEFENDANT 
OUT AND DETAINING HIM WAS IN FACT REASONABLE. 
NOW, ONCE THE DEFENDANT STARTS TO STRUGGLE, AS 
DEPUTY HAUSSLER TESTIFIED HE KICKED HIM IN THE LEGS, THAT 
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M IS AN INTERFERENCE. IT 'S ASSAULT OF A POLICE OFFICER, AS 
2
 DEFENSE COUNSEL EVEN POINTS OUT, THAT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER 
3 OR NOT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RESIST AN INTERFERENCE CHARGE 
4
 OR RIGHT TO RESIST A SEARCH, THAT I WILL ADDRESS IN A 
5
 I MOMENT, OR ANYTHING ELSE. 
6 STATE V. GARDNER SPECIFICALLY SAYS YOU DO NOT 
7 HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSAULT A POLICE OFFICER EVEN TO RESIST 
8
 AN ARREST AND EVEN TO RESIST AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. YOU JUST 
9 CAN'T ASSAULT THAT POLICE OFFICER. SO ONCE HE KICKS HIM, 
10 HE HAS NO DEFENSE ON THAT AT ALL, UNDER ANY STRETCH OF THE 
11 IMAGINATION. THEY HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM. HE'S 
12 PLACED UNDER ARREST. THERE IS A STATUTE THAT DOESN'T 
13 REQUIRE HIM TO SIT THERE AND EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT HE'S UNDER 
1 4
 ARREST FOR WHEN IT'S TAKING PLACE, WHEN THEY ARREST HIM IN 
15 THE ACT OF DOING WHAT HE'S BEING ARRESTED FOR. 
16 THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT COUNT 2 ON THE THRESHOLD? 
17 MR. PARKER: WELL, AS FAR AS THE THRESHOLD, IT IS 
18 THERE, I BELIEVE. OFFICER HAUSSLER TESTIFIED IN HIS 
19 OPINION, THE FIRST ESTIMATE WAS $ 1 , 5 0 0 . THEN HIS 
20 UNDERSTANDING WAS $700 . WE INTEND, YOUR HONOR, TO PREVENT 
21 I A LESSER INCLUDED INDICATING THE AMOUNT OF THE $178 . I 
22 BELIEVE THAT'S THE MORE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. BUT WEIGHING 
23 I THE CREDIBILITY AND THE ABILITY OF THE CONFLICTING PEOPLE 
24 TO GIVE TESTIMONY ON WHAT IT IS OR IT IS NOT IS SIMPLY A 
25 I PREROGATIVE FOR THE JURY. IF THE COURT IS OF A MIND TO 
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1 OVERRULE THE JURY ON THAT, IF IT DOES DECIDE — 
2 THE COURT: THE JURY HASN'T RULED YET. 
3 MR. PARKER: THAT'S CORRECT. AND THAT'S SIMPLY 
4 WHAT I'M ASKING THE COURT TO DO IS LET THE JURY RULE. 
5
 I THE COURT: I'M NOT GOING TO. THE TESTIMONY THAT 
6 PUTS IT OVER THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT IS INSUFFICIENT FOR ANY 
7 JURY TO BASE A VERDICT OF GUILTY ON. 
8
 I MR. PARKER: WELL, THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 THE COURT: IF THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO 
10 FOUNDATIONAL OBJECTION MADE, I WOULD HAVE SUSTAINED IT AND, 
11 TO ME, THE ONLY POSSIBLE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IS THE $178. 
12 MR. PARKER: IN THAT CASE, THE STATUTE DOESN'T 
13 I ALLOW IT AND I WOULD MOVE TO AMEND TO THE APPROPRIATE 
H AMOUNT. FRANKLY, I WILL HAVE TO CHECK WHAT CRIMINAL 
15 I MISCHIEF IS. RIGHT NOW IT'S UNDER $300, A CLASS B. BUT WE 
16 HAVE TO APPLY THEN AND — 
17 THE COURT: YOU FIGURE OUT WHAT IT IS. 
18 MR. PARKER: IF I CAN DO THAT. 
19 THE COURT; IT'S NOT GOING TO STAY IN AS IT IS. 
20 MR. PARKER: I BELIEVE IT'S UNDER $500 IS A 
21 CLASS B. 
22 THE COURT: FIGURE IT OUT. I DON'T RULE IN ORDER 
23 TO GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND. 
24 MR. PARKER: MAYBE I CAN FIGURE IT OUT HERE. 
25 THE COURT: ONCE I DISMISS IT, YOU MAY NOT BE 
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1 ABLE.TO AMEND, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO ALLOW IT TO GO TO THE 
2
 I JURY IN THE FORM IT'S NOW PLED, AND THAT IS AS A CLASS A 
3 MISDEMEANOR. 
4 SO LET'S FIGURE IT OUT OVER THE LUNCH HOUR. I 
5
 DON'T WANT TO BE KEEPING THIS JURY OUT WHILE WE'RE DOING 
6 TECHNICAL STUFF. 
7 MR. PARKER: LESS THAN $250 IS A CLASS C 
8
 I MISDEMEANOR. WE WOULD MAKE THAT AMENDMENT. 
9 THE COURT: YOU MOVE TO AMEND THAT? 
10 MR. PARKER: I DO. 
11 MR. MACK: NO OBJECTION. 
12 THE COURT: THAT AMENDMENT IS GRANTED. COUNT 2 
13 IS NOW CHARGED AS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR. I NEED YOU, OVER 
14
 THE LUNCH HOUR, TO HAVE THE CHARGES TYPED OUT IN SUCH FORM 
15 THAT YOU WILL PUT IT IN IF YOU WERE TO HAVE A WRITTEN 
16 AMENDMENT TO THE INFORMATION SO I CAN GET IT DOWN TO THE 
17 SECRETARY TO INCLUDE IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND A 
18 DIFFERENT FORM. 
19 MR. PARKER: I WILL ALSO SUBMIT ANOTHER JURY 
20 INSTRUCTION WITH THE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE. 
21 THE COURT: I'M SATISFIED ON THE OTHER ISSUES 
22 THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER ON THIS, AND IT'S FOR 
23 THE REASON INDICATED BY MR. PARKER THAT THE MOTION SHOULD 
24 BE DENIED. EXCEPT I MUST SAY THAT I DO HAVE SOME CONCERN 
25 .^ .SED ON STATE V. DIVERS, BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER 
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1 ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR THE LAWFULNESS OF THIS ARREST. 
2 FOR THAT REASON, THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED. 
3 AND NOW, HAVING GRANTED THE AMENDMENT, I ALSO FIND THERE IS 
4 NO REASON TO DISMISS COUNT 2, BECAUSE IT'S NOW BEEN 
5
 AMENDED. ALL RIGHT. 
6 MR. MACK: YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD HAVE LEAVE TO 
7 ADD TO THE RECORD ON SOME POINT ON THIS. 
8 THE COURT: TO DO WHAT? 
9 1 MR. MACK: TO ADD TO THE RECORD ON SOME POINT. 
10 I THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO, TESTIFY? 
11 MR. MACK: JUST SUBMIT SOMETHING IN ARGUMENT, 
U MAKE SURE I HAVE COVERED ALL THE BASES. 
13 THE COURT: I THINK YOU'RE FULLY COVERED. YOU 
H MEAN YOU CAN'T ADD ANY EVIDENCE UNLESS YOU WANT TO TESTIFY? 
15 YOU'VE GOT ALL THE EVIDENCE. THEY'VE GOT EVERYTHING THEY 
16 NEED IF THEY WANT TO REVERSE ME ON IT. 
17 MR. PARKER: CAN WE HAVE THE JURY AND THE 
18 WITNESS, AT LEAST GET STARTED? 
19 THE COURT: THERE'S A FUNERAL TODAY THAT I NEED 
20 TO ATTEND. I'M LEAVING AT 11:30. THAT'S WHY I SAID 
21 YESTERDAY WE ARE GOING TO LUNCH FROM 11:30 TO 1:30. 
22 (WHEREUPON, THE JURY RETURNED TO THE COURTROOM.) 
23 THE COURT: THIRD DISTRICT COURT AGAIN IN 
24 SESSION. BE SEATED, FOLKS. THE JURY IS NOW PRESENT. 
25 I MEMBERS OF THE JURY, YOU WILL BE HAPPY TO KNOW 
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THAT WHILE YOU WERE OUT IN THE HALLS LUXURIATING, WE WERE 
CONTINUING TO DO BUSINESS IN HERE. BUT WE GOT SOME 
BUSINESS DONE THAT WE WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO CONSUME SOME 
OF YOUR TIME WITH. SO IT WAS AN EFFICIENT BREAK. 
GO AHEAD, MR. MACK. 
MR. MACK: YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD CALL GREG FARRER. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
GREG FARRER, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY THE DEFENSE, HAVING BEEN 
DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED ON HIS OATH 
AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MACK: 
Q. MR. FARRER, COULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME AND SPELL 
YOUR LAST NAME, PLEASE. 
A. GREG FARRER, F-A-R-R-E-R. 
Q. MR. FARRER, WHERE DO YOU LIVE? 
A. IN DUBLIN, CALIFORNIA. 
Q. DUBLIN, CALIFORNIA? OKAY. WHAT WOULD WE 
RECOGNIZE THE BIGGEST CITY THAT THAT MIGHT BE BY? 
A. IT'S SOUTHWEST OF OAKLAND. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT'S YOUR BIRTH DATE, GREG? 
A. 11-11-74. 
Q. HOW OLD ARE YOU NOW? 
A. 20. 
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Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3 
Your are instructed that a police officer may arrest a 
person for any public offense committed in the officer's 
presence. 
A police officer may also arrest a person without a warrant 
for an offense committed outside of the officer's presence when 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has 
committed a public offense and probable cause to believe that the 
person may conceal evidence of the commission of the offense or 
injure another person. 
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IK^TRUCTIOM NO. J?V*_, 
An officer has probable cause to arc est <~ person for a crime 
committed outside of the officer's presence *>hen: 
1. Considering ihe facts known to iiie officer, and the 
inferences which might be fairly drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent officer in his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense. 
and 
2. Considering the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
officer in his position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect may 
(a) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
offense, QXL 
(b) injure another person or damage property belonging 
to another person. 
The determination of whether probable cause exists depends 
upon an examination of all the information available to the 
arresting officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time when the arrest was made. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. $& 
You are instructed that a person may be charged with 
disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He intends to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof; 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
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INSTRUCTION N6.<£(r? 
You are instructed that a person may be charged with 
intoxication if he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or 
any substance to a degree that the person may endanger himself or 
another, in i public place or iu a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons* 
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